Public Choice

Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock
Autocracy and coups d’etat
Editorial announcement
Gordon Tullock and experimental economics
Gordon Tullock and Public Choice
Gordon Tullock’s contribution to bureaucracy
Gordon Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics
Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?
The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock
The economic theory of rent seeking
The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock
The life and times of Gordon Tullock
Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent
Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk
Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures
What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that
Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock